Abstract-Recently, a secrecy measure based on listreconstruction has been proposed [1] , in which a wiretapper is allowed to produce a list of 2 mR L reconstruction sequences and secrecy is measured by the minimum distortion over the entire list. In this paper, we show that this list secrecy problem is equivalent to one with secrecy measured by a new quantity lossy-equivocation, which is proven to be the minimum optimistic 1-achievable source coding rate of the source with the wirtapped signal as two-sided information, and also can be seen as an extension of conventional equivocation to lossy case. Upon this (or list) secrecy measure, we study source-channel secrecy problem in the discrete memoryless Shannon cipher system with noisy wiretap channel. Two inner bounds and an outer bound on the achievable region of secret key rate, list rate, wiretapper distortion, and distortion of legitimate user are given. The inner bounds are derived by using an uncoded scheme and a (operationly) separate scheme, respectively. Thanks to the equivalence between lossy-equivocation secrecy and list secrecy, the information spectrum method is leveraged to prove the outer bound. As special cases, the admissible region for the cases of degraded wiretap channel or lossless communication for legitimate user has been characterized completely. For both these two cases, separate scheme is proven to be optimal. Interestingly, however, separation indeed suffers performance loss for other certain cases. Besides, we also extend our results to characterize the achievable region for Gaussian communication case. As a side product optimistic lossy source coding has also been addressed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon cipher system (the one with noisy channel depicted in Fig. 1 ) was first investigated by Shannon [2] , in which sender A communicates with legitimate receiver B secretly by exploiting a secret key that is shared by them. In [2] , Shannon studied this system with adequate amount of secret key. However in practice, the amount of key may be insufficient, and wiretapper might only want to reconstruct a lossy version of the source. Schieler et al. [1] proposed a distortion-based secrecy measure around the assumption that the wiretapper has ability to conduct list decoding with fixed list size, and the induced distortion is set to the minimum distortion over the entire list. They studied it in the Shannon cipher system with noiseless channel, and characterized the optimal tradeoff of secret key rate, list rate, wiretapper distortion, and distortion of legitimate user.
In addition, some researchers investigated source-channel secrecy problem. Yamamoto [5] studied it in Shannon cipher system with secrecy measured by the minimum distortion that incurs in reconstructing the source for a wiretapper. A different formulation of the problem was considered in [8] , where the authors assumed there is a fixed information leakage to the wiretapper and wish to minimize the distortion at the legitimate receiver, while at the same time providing a graceful distortion degradation when there is an SNR mismatch. They show that, for a positive leakage, this can be achieved by vector quantization and scaling. The main idea is to use a secrecy code to encode the quantized message and then transmit a message that is the superposition of the secret quantized message with a scaled version of the quantization error. This scenario was extended to consider side information at the receiver in [9] or side information at the sender in [10] . Besides, joint source-channel secrecy with noncausal side informations available at both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper has been studied in [11] , and with causal source disclosure at the eavesdropper has been studied in [12] .
In this paper, the list secrecy measure [1] is applied to the source-channel secrecy problem in Shannon cipher system, where a discrete memoryless source transmitted over a discrete memoryless noisy wiretap channel (see Fig. 1 ), and then we investigate the the achievable region of secret key rate, list rate, wiretapper distortion, and distortion of legitimate user for given source-channel pair. By information spectrum analysis, we find that this problem (or an equivalent henchman problem) is equivalent to one with secrecy measured by a new quantity, lossy-equivocation, which is a conditional rate-distortion function achieved by extending conventional equivocation (conditional entropy) to lossy case. From perspective of optimistic source coding, the lossyequivocation is proven to be the minimum optimistic 1-achievable source coding rate of the source with the wirtapped signal as two-sided information. Thanks to the equivalence between lossy-equivocation secrecy and list secrecy, it allows us to leverage the information spectrum method to analyze these problems, and then to obtain a converse result. Besides, two achievability schemes, uncoded scheme and (operationly) separate scheme, are analyzed. When specialized to lossless communication case or degraded wiretap channel case, the separate scheme is proven to be optimal and the admissible region is characterized completely. The result for lossless communication is an extension of Wyner's result [3] and Csiszár et al.'s result [4] to the case with secrecy measured by lossy-equivocation. Interestingly, however, we observe that separate scheme loses the optimality for other certain cases. This implies separation is not optimal in general for the source-channel secrecy problem.
Besides, we extend our result to characterize the achievable region for the Gaussian communication case. Since the standard discretization technique that usually used in proving the achievability for the continuous source or continuous channel, is invalid in analyzing the probability of excess distortion, some other techniques including d−tilted information, weak typicality, and specified discretization, are exploited in our proof.
In our work, optimistic source coding plays a big role in enabling information spectrum analysis of list secrecy prob-lem. Optimistic source coding (lossless case) and optimistic channel coding are first investigated in Chen et al.'s seminal work [7] . As an extension to lossy case, optimistic lossy source coding has been addressed in this paper as a side product.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation and Preliminaries
Information spectrum analysis [6] will be used frequently in this paper. For a general sequence of random variables B = {B n } n∈N 1 , define
and
For any general pair of random variables (U, V) with joint distribution P UV {P U n V n } n∈N , define, for each n, the normalized information density random variables
Given {ı n (U n ; V n )} n∈N , we may now define
analysis, I(U; V) and I(U; V) the spectral inf-and supmutual information rates respectively. They are respectively the p-lim inf and p-lim sup of the sequence of random variables {ı n (U n ; V n )} n∈N . As special cases, spectral infand sup-entropy rates are defined as
In addition, for any sequence of distortion functions
B. List Secrecy
Consider Shannon cipher system with noisy wiretap channel shown in Fig. 1 , where sender A and legitimate receiver B share a secret key K that uniformly distributed over 2 mRK 2 and independent of a source S m . The sender A observes the discrete memoryless (DM) source sequence S m that i.i.d. according to P S , then transmits it to legitimate user B over a DM wiretap channel P Y Z|X confidentially by utilizing the secret key and wiretap channel. Then legitimate user B produces a source reconstructionŜ m using the received sequence Y n and secret key K.
1 Throughout this paper, we use the boldface to denote a sequence of random variables, e.g., B = {Bn} n∈N . 2 In this paper, the set {1, ..., l} is sometimes denoted by [l] . 
Assume the source sample rate is B s and the channel sample rate is B c . Define the bandwidth mismatch factor as γ Bc Bs . Then for any (m, n, R K ) block code that can be implemented in the Shannon cipher system with bandwidth mismatch factor γ, it should hold that n m ≤ γ. Note that any (m, n , R K ) code with n m ≤ γ can be seen as a special case of (m, n, R K ) codes with n = mγ 4 that for each block, only n channel symbols are used. Hence we only need consider (m, n, R K ) codes with n = mγ for the system with bandwidth mismatch factor γ.
In addition, another output Z n of the channel is accessed by a wiretapper Eve. Based on Z n , the wiretapper produces a list L(Z n ) ⊆Š m and the induced distortion is set to the minimum one over the entire list, i.e., minšm ∈L(
is a distortion measure for wiretapper. For given distortion levels D B and D E , exploiting the secret key and the wiretap channel, Nodes A and B want to communicate the source within D B , while ensuring that the wiretapper's strategy always suffers distortion above D E with high probability.
there exists a sequence of (m, n, R K ) codes with n = mγ such that ∀δ > 0, 1) Distortion constraint:
where
is a distortion measure for legitimate user B; 2) Secrecy constraint:
for any sequence of lists {L m } such that lim sup m→∞
It is easy to verify that in Definition 2, the constraints 1) and 2) can be respectively replaced with
and D E (S,Š) ≥ D E for any sequence of lists such that lim sup m→∞
We assume all the alphabets of source and its reconstructions (at legitimate user or wiretapper), as well as the alphabets of channel input and outputs are finite.
C. Henchman Problem
The problem above is equivalent to a henchman problem [1] , in which wiretapper reconstructs a single sequence with the help of a rate-limited henchman who can access to the source S m and the wiretapped signal Z n . As depicted in Fig.  2 , the wiretapper receives the best possible mR m bits from the henchman to assist in producing a reconstruction sequencě S m .
We assume that the wiretapper and henchman are aware of the scheme that Nodes A and B adopt, hence they cooperate to design a code with encoder m H = ϕ H (s m , z n ) and decodeř
That is to say the henchman code is designed based on the (m, n, R K ) block code adopted by sender and legitimate user.
is achievable in the henchman problem if there exists a sequence of (m, n, R K ) codes with n = mγ such that 1) Distortion constraint:
where R m 's are the rates of henchman codes.
D. Lossy-Equivocation Secrecy
Besides, the list secrecy problem and the henchman problem also can be formulated as a communication problem with secrecy measured by lossy-equivocation.
Note that
Hence spectral inf-equivocation (or conditional spectral infentropy) can be defined as H(S|Z). This term is very related to the conventional equivocation lim inf m→∞ H(S|Z). Both of them denote the conditional entropies, but the former is defined in sense of limit inferior in probability, and the latter is defined in sense of expectation.
In lossy-equivocation secrecy problem, sender and legitimate user jointly design an (m, n, R K ) block code to maximize lossy-equivocation.
there exists a sequence of (m, n, R K ) codes with n = mγ such that 1) Distortion constraint:
Besides, by setting d B (s m ,ŝ m ) = 1 {s m =ŝ m } and 0 ≤ D B < 1, the achievable tuples for lossless communication in these problems can be defined similarly.
is achievable for lossless communication if there exists a sequence of (m, n, R K ) codes with n = mγ such that lim m→∞ P(S m =Ŝ m ) = 0, and the secrecy constraint in Definition 2, 5 or 7 holds. The admissible region
is achievable} for this case.
All these three problems above are related to optimistic source coding problem [7] . Information spectrum characterization of optimistic lossy source coding is given in the following theorem, the proof of which is prevented in Appendix A. To state our results concisely, for a general sequence of random variables U, V and a sequence of distortion measures
Theorem 1 (Optimistic ε-Achievable Source Coding). Given source S and two-sided information Z, there exists a sequence of R m -rate fixed-length codes (f m , g m )
(these codes are named optimistic ε-achievable source codes; see [7] ), whereŠ
Comparing Constraint 2) in Definition 5 with (14) and (15) tells us that given source S and two-sided information Z, the minimum optimistic 1-achievable source coding rate equals the maximum of R L 's that satisfy Constraint 2) in henchman problem. On the other hand, comparing the definition of lossyequivocation with (16) tells us
Hence Theorem 1 implies the equivalence between the lossyequivocation secrecy problem and the henchman problem. In addition, the equivalence between the list secrecy problem and the henchman problem has been proven by Schieler and Cuff [1, Prop. 1] . Hence these three problems are equivalent to each other as stated in the following proposition.
is achievable in the list secrecy problem if and only if it is achievable in the henchman problem, and also if and only if it is achievable in the lossy-equivocation secrecy problem.
From this proposition and Definition 7, the admissible region for these problems can be characterized using information spectrum quantities as
In addition, we also consider the Shannon cipher system of communicating Gaussian source over power-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. For this case, the channel input cost constraint
should be added to Definitions 2, 5 and 7, where
is cost function of the wiretap channel, and for power-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel ρ (x) = x 2 . For the system involving channel cost constraint, Proposition 1 still holds.
III. LOSSLESS COMMUNICATION
Consider lossless communication of source to the legitimate user. The admissible region R of (R K , R L , D E ) is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Lossless Communication). For lossless Shannon cipher system of transmitting a DM source over a DM wiretap channel, we have
denotes the capacity of the channel P Y |X ,
denotes the equivocation-capacity function of the wiretap channel which is first defined by Csiszár et al. [4] and
denotes the rate-distortion function of S.
Proof: The proof of converse part is given in Appendix B. As for the achievability part, lossless communication can be roughly considered as a special case of lossy communication, hence the achievability part of Theorem 2 can be obtained by following similar steps to the proof of the achievability part of Theorem 3, which is stated in Section IV.
Note that the result for the case with no henchman (or only a single reconstruction allowed) is obtained by setting R L = 0 in the region of Theorem 2. In this case, any positive rate of secret key or any positive Γ 1 ( 1 γ H(S)) results in the maximum expected distortion that can occur. This observation coincides with that for the noiseless wiretap channel case [1] .
The first constraint of R is consistent with the sourcechannel separation theorem, and the second constraint of R, roughly speaking, follows from the following argument. On one hand, the henchman and the wiretapper can always ignore the signal Z n and and use a point-to-point code to achieve R S (D E ). On the other hand, the optimal strategy of sender and legitimate user is a operationly separate coding scheme, in which the source is first compressed by an optimal source code with rate H (S), then a part (R K rate) of the resulting bitstream is encrypted by one-time pad, finally all the bitstream is transmitted losslessly to legitimate user using an optimal secrecy-channel code [4] . The optimal secrecychannel code is a superposition code with two layers U n and V n , and the secrecy is obtained only in the second layer, i.e., V n . For such optimal strategy, upon Z n the wiretapper can reconstruct the first layer U n directly, and further reconstruct V n upon both Z n and U n by using rate γ (I (V ; Y |U ) − I (V ; Z|U )). Then the wiretapper uses R K rate to decrypt the secret key, and finally reconstructs the source losslessly from the secret key and the messages (U n , V n ) as the legitimate user does. In addition, if legitimate user's channel is less noisy than the wiretapper's (i.e., for every V → X → Y Z, I (V ; Y ) ≥ I (V ; Z) holds; see [13] ), then Csiszár et al. [4, Thm. 3] showed
IV. LOSSY COMMUNICATION Now, we consider lossy communication case. Define
where C B , Γ 1 (·) and R S (·) are respectively defined by (20), (21) and (22),
with I Q (·) denoting the mutual information under distribution Q X Q Y Z|X , is another function specified by the wiretap channel, and
denotes the rate-distortion function of S with two-sided informationŜ. Then we have the following theorem on lossy communication.
Theorem 3 (Lossy Communication).
For lossy Shannon cipher system of transmitting a DM source over a DM wiretap channel, we have
Proof: The proofs of the outer bound and the inner bound R (i) sep are given in [15] and Appendix C, respectively. Now we give a proof sketch of the inner bound R (i) unc (the details see [15] ). For simplicity, we only consider the case of m = n = 1. For given P X|SK , supposeŝ (y, k) achieves minŝ (y,k) Ed B (S,Ŝ). Consider the following uncoded scheme.
Encoder: Upon (S, K), the sender produces X stochastically according to probability distribution P X|SK .
Decoder: Legitimate user producesŜ =ŝ (Y, K).
Then by law of large numbers, the distortion constraint at legitimate user is satisfied immediately. Utilizing [1, Lem. 6], the strong converse for lossy source coding for memoryless source with memoryless side information can be proven. This implies if
sep is a generalization of the achievability of Theorem 2 to lossy case, and obtained by an operationly separate scheme, and R (i) unc is achieved by the uncoded scheme above in which both the encoder and decoder are symbolby-symbol mappings. Different from the lossless case, for lossy communication the source may be transmitted using uncoded scheme or other lossy joint source-channel secrecy code, and there may be no message (digital information) transmitted. Hence for this case the wiretapper cannot decrypt the source through decrypting digital information. This leads to the difficulty in analyzing the outer bound part. We leverage information spectrum method to derive the outer bound R (o) . Instead of reconstructing the source directly, an indirect decryption strategy is considered in our proof, which can be roughly considered as follows: the wiretapper first reconstructs Y n using rate γΓ 2 1 γ I(S;Ŝ) , next decrypts the secret key using rate R K , then upon Y n and secret key, produces the legitimate user's reconstructionŜ n , and finally uponŜ n produces a final reconstructionŠ n using rate R S|Ŝ (D E ). This leads to the outer bound R (o) . sep differ only in the gamma functions Γ 1 (·) and Γ 2 (·). Obviously, Γ 1 (·) and Γ 2 (·) both only depend on margin distributions of the wiretap channel, and
. Moreover for (stochastically) degraded wiretap channel, it is easy to verify that Γ 1 (R) = Γ 2 (R). Hence for this case, R coincide.
Theorem 4 (DM System with Degraded Wiretap Channel). For Shannon cipher system with a DM source and a DM degraded wiretap channel (X
Theorem 4 implies the separate coding is optimal for degraded channel case. However, this is not true in general. In fact, there exists some source-channel pair such that uncoded scheme strictly outperforms separate scheme (the detail available in [15, Example 1] ). This striking observation is very different from the case with no secrecy constraint. Since without secrecy constraint, separation is proven to be optimal for source-channel coding problem [13] .
Besides, when specialized to communication over noiseless wiretap channel with channel capacity C B , i.e., Y = Z = X and H(X) = C B , the problem turns into the one considered by Schieler et al. [4] . For this case, Γ 1 (R) = Γ 2 (R) = 0 for any R ≥ 0. Hence Theorem 3 recovers the admissible region given in [1, Thm.3] .
V. GAUSSIAN COMMUNICATION
The results above can be extended to Gaussian communication scenario. Consider communicating a Gaussian source S ∼ N (0, N S ) over a Gaussian wiretap channel, N (0, N B ) and W E ∼ N (0, N E − N B ) are independent, and transmitting power is constrained as lim n→∞ P 1 n n i=1 X 2 i ≤ P + δ = 1, ∀δ > 0. Then we have the following theorem, the proof of which is given in [15] owing to space limitation.
Theorem 5 (Gaussian Communication). For Shannon cipher system of transmitting a Gaussian source S ∼ N (0, N S ) over a Gaussian wiretap channel, the admissible region is
The region in Theorem 5 is illustrated in Fig. 3 . Besides, for a Gaussian communication with bandwidth match case (i.e., γ = 1), an uncoded scheme (analog coding) has been proposed in [14] . The this scheme achieves the optimal tradeoff of (R K , R L , D B , D E ) above for certain cases.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated list secrecy measure for source-channel secrecy problem in Shannon cipher system. By associating it with optimistic source coding, we established the equivalence between list secrecy problem and the one with secrecy measured by lossy-equivocation. The lossy-equivocation is a direct extension of conventional equivocation proposed in Wyner's seminal work [3] . Utilizing information spectrum method to analyze lossy-equivocation, we obtained several converse results for the systems with various classes of source-channel pairs. Some special cases including lossless communication, communication over DM degraded wiretap channel, and Gaussian communication, are completely resolved. For these cases, separate coding is proven to be optimal, but this does not hold in general.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Sufficiency
S|Z (D E ), and for δ > 0, denote
Then consider the following coding scheme. Codebook Generation: For each z n , we independently generate sequences s m (i, z n ) , i ∈ [2 mR ] according to P S m |Z n =z n . Denote the subcodebook as C z n , and the whole codebook as C = {C z n } z n ∈Z n .
Encoder:
then following from the argument in [6, proof 1) of Thm. 5.2.1], we have the following lemma. The proof is omitted here.
On the other hand, according to the definitions of I(·) and D (ε) E (·), and from (28) and (29), we have
Hence
Combining this with Lemma 1 gives us lim inf m→∞ P m e < ε. Therefore, (R, D E ) is optimistically ε-achievable. Letting δ → 0 completes the proof of the sufficency.
B. Necessity
Assume a sequence of R m -rate fixed-length codes
Set S =Š, (37) immediately yields
Hence we only need prove I(S; S|Z) ≤ R or I(S;Š|Z) ≤ R. 
On the other hand, lim sup m→∞ R m ≤ R for any z n , and
Hence it holds that
which further implies I(S;Š|Z) ≤ R + 2δ. This means I(S;Š|Z) ≤ R because δ > 0 is arbitrary. Combining it with (38) completes the proof of R (ε)
APPENDIX B PROOF OF CONVERSE OF THEOREM 2
From source-channel coding theorem [13] , we have γC B ≥ H (S). In addition, if R L > R S (D E ), then no matter what scheme Nodes A and B use, the henchman and the wiretapper can ignore Z n altogether and simply use a point-to-point ratedistortion code to describe S m within distortion D E (with probability 1). Hence, to prevent wiretapper from achieving this, R L ≤ R S (D E ) holds. To show the outer bound, we only need to prove if
or equivalently to show
To that end, we borrow information spectrum method [6] . From the conditional version of the optimistic ε-achievable source coding theorem [7, Thm. 3 .1], we have that if R > H(S|Z), then there exists a source code with rate R and with reconstruction S m such that
Then we have
(46) In addition, R S|Z (D E ) is the minimum rate of the codes such that lim inf
Consider
To upper bound H(S|ZK), the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 3. [6, Thm.1.7.2] For any P KSZ ,
Observe that if K = ∅, the term
is just the equivocation [3] , [4] . Csiszár et al. [4] proved that when there is no secret key K,
holds. Hence follow similar steps to their proof, one can show that for the case with secret key,
holds as well. Owing to space limitation, the detailed proof is presented in [15] . Finally, combining (47), (51), (52) and (53) gives (43), which completes the proof. 6 We assume that for every s ∈ S, there existsš ∈Š such that d E (s,š) = 0. Note that this condition can be removed if we use lim infm→∞ P S m Z n S m − P S m Z n S m T V < 1 to replace (44). This is feasible by applying likelihood encoder instead of the standard encoder.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF INNER BOUND R (i)
SEP OF THEOREM 3 It is hard to obtain any desired inner bound through directly analyzing the lossy-equivocation using information spectrum method, but it is feasible by analyzing the henchman problem instead. Next we prove R 
and define
Hence R t ≥ I(S;Ŝ) + . Besides, for simplicity we assume mγ is an integer, hence n = mγ. Codebook Generation: Randomly and independently generate sequencesŝ 
is revealed to all parties including the wiretapper. Based on the codebook above, on one hand, passŝ m (J) through a memoryless channel P S|Ŝ to generate a sequence S m ; on the other hand, pass v n (M ) through a memoryless channel P Z|V to generate a sequence Z n (this is equivalent to a stochastic channel encoder P X n |M,C = n i=1 P X|V (x i |v i (M )) for channel P Z|X ). Finally, transmit S m over a R m rate noiseless channel with help of twosided information (Z n , M 0 ). The distribution Q KS m JMŜ m U n V n Y n Z n incurred by the subproblem above is
where P M |KJ is the distribution induced by one-time pad operation, and Q S m J (s m , j) 2 −mRt m i=1 P S|Ŝ (s i |ŝ i (j)). It is easy to verify E C Q S mŜm (s m ,ŝ m ) = 
The proof of this theorem is available in [15] , which follows similar steps to that of [1, Thm. 4] .
B. Likelihood encoder
Consider the codebook defined in the above subproblem, and define a likelihood encoder by P J|S m (j|s m ) ∝ m i=1 P S|Ŝ (s i |ŝ i (j)), where ∝ indicates that appropriate normalization is required. Now we consider Node A adopts this likelihood encoder cascaded with the one-time pad M k = J k ∧ K, the bijective function (m 0 , m 1 ) = g(m k , j p ), and the stochastic channel encoder P X n |M,C = n i=1 P X|V (x i |v i (M )) as described in the subproblem above. For such cascaded encoder, the induced overall distribution is
Besides, P KS m JMŜ m U n V n Y n Z n is intimately related to the idealized distribution Q KS m JMŜ m U n V n Y n Z n which is defined in previous subsection. Schieler et al. [1, showed that if R t > I(S;Ŝ), then lim m→∞ E C P S m J − Q S m J T V = 0. Hence using the property P X P Y |X − Q X P Y |X T V = P X − Q X T V , we have
Combine this with Theorem 6, and let → 0, then we have that if R L ≤ min R K +γΓ 1 1 γ I(S;Ŝ) +R S|Ŝ (D E ), R S (D E ) , the cascaded encoder above satisfies (62).
In addition, the achievability for the legitimate user is easy to be verified. This completes the proof of R (i) sep .
